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NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT UNDER THE
MINNESOTA MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The notice of claim requirement' of the Minnesota Municipal Tort
Liability Act 2 poses, with few exceptions,3 a significant hurdle for claimants seeking redress for injuries allegedly suffered through municipal
negligence.' The Act requires that notice be served upon the municipal
governing body, as a condition precedent to suit, within 180 days of the
1. MINN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1976) provides:
Except as provided in subdivisions 2 and 3, every person who claims damages
from any municipality for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope
of section 466.02 [torts of municipalities and municipal employees] shall cause
to be presented to the governing body of the municipality within 180 days after
the alleged loss or injury is discovered a notice stating the time, place and
circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. Actual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put the governing body
of the municipality or its insurer on notice of a possible claim shall be construed
to comply with the notice requirements of this section. Failure to state the
amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice; but in such case, the claimant shall furnish full information regarding the
nature and extent of the injuries and damages within 15 days after demand by
the municipality. No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has
been given and unless the action is commenced within one year after such
notice. The time for giving such notice does not include the time, not exceeding
90 days, during which the person injured is incapacitated by the injury from
giving the notice.
2. MINN. STAT. ch. 466 (1976).
3. No notice is required for injuries from intentional torts or the use of motor vehicles
owned by a municipality or operated by its employees. MINN. STAT. § 466.05(2) (1976).
Notice of a claim for wrongful death may be given within one year. Id. § 466.05(3) (1976).
See also id. § 466.03 (exceptions to municipal tort liability). Prior to the adoption of the
Municipal Tort Liability Act, the Minnesota Supreme Court had held that notice need
only be given in cases involving negligence. See Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428,
438, 57 N.W.2d 254, 262 (1953) (notice requirement not applicable to action against
municipal liquor store under Civil Damages Act). However, the validity of the Hahn
holding is doubtful in light of the Municipal Tort Liability Act, which specifically applies
to all torts by municipalities or their employees or agents. See MINN. STAT. § 466.02 (1976).
Moreover, it should be noted that since Hahn, the Minnesota Legislature has adopted a
notice statute specifically applicable to dramshop actions against municipalities. MINN.
STAT. § 340.951 (1976), as amended by Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 390, 1977 Minn. Laws 888.
Unlike the general notice statute, however, the notice period is only 120 days. Id.
4. MINN. STAT. § 466.01(1) (1976) defines a municipality as "any . . . city, whether
organized under home rule charter or otherwise, any county, town, public authority,
public corporation, special district, school district, however organized, or other political
subdivision." Thus, for example, the Act applies to torts of a housing and redevelopment
authority, McCaleb v. Jackson, Minn. -,
.
239 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1976), and
to airport commissions, Sorenson v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Int'l Airports Comm'n, 289
Minn. 207, 208-09, 183 N.W.2d 292, 294 (1971), but not to state universities, Walstad v.
University of Minn. Hosps., 442 F.2d 634, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1971).
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plaintiff's injury.5 Moreover, suit must be commenced within one year
of the date notice is given.' With the abolition of sovereign immunity
in Minnesota,7 the notice requirement remains a last vestige of the
theory that governmental entities deserve special protection against
claims arising from their torts. This Note first will examine the origins
and rationales of the notice requirement.' Next, the various judicial and
legislative modifications of the requirement will be analyzed. These
modifications involve incapacitated claimants,9 estoppel and waiver,'o
the doctrine of substantial compliance," and abolition of the requirement on constitutional grounds. Finally, an amendment of the notice
requirement will be proposed which would preserve the protection that
notice justifiably affords municipalities while relieving the inequities
that often result from a rigid application of the requirement. 3
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The doctrine of sovereign immunity, arising from feudal England,
provided that the state was above the law and that only with its consent
could an action be maintained against it." This doctrine was first applied to local units of government in the 1788 English case of Russell v.
Men of Devon,5 where suit was barred against an unincorporated county
so the public would not "suffer an inconvenience."' 6 From this somewhat dubious beginning, the doctrine became firmly established in this
country in the nineteenth century 7 and eventually was extended to
5. MINN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1976).

6. Id.
7. See notes 24-29 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 14-41 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 47-57 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 58-73 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 74-106 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 107-96 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 197-204 infra and accompanying text.
14. For a good discussion of the origins of sovereign immunity, see Muskopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 214 n.1, 359 P.2d 457, 458 n.1, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 n.1 (1961).
15. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
16. Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. The court further observed that it is a principle of
law that no man can be responsible for an injury unless it is caused by his own act or
default. Since the defendant was composed of a fluctuating number of inhabitants, the
court concluded that new residents who might have moved in after an injury, but before
a judgment, would thus unlawfully have been liable for damages. Id. at 668, 100 Eng.
Rep. at 360. Such reasoning has been characterized as "an anachronism without rational
basis (that) has existed only by virtue of inertia," Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1961), and "unjust, unsupported
by any valid reason and [which] has no rightful place in modern day society," Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 II1.2d 11, 25, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959).
17. After mentioning the doctrine as early as 1810, see Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks
& Canals, 7 Mass. 169, 187-88 (1810) (dicta), Massachusetts became the first American
jurisdiction to recognize sovereign immunity. See Mower v. Leicaster, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
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include virtually all levels of local government."
Although sovereign immunity was the general rule, it was subject to
both statutory and judicial exceptions" and notice of claim requirements were enacted to apply when any of these exceptions were available against a municipality.1 The first notice statute of statewide application in Minnesota was enacted in 1897.1 It contained a thirty-day
notice period and required that the action be commenced within one
year after the injury.u The 1897 statute required that written notice be
served upon the municipal governing body and that it contain the time,
place, and circumstances of the alleged injury and the amount of compensation or other relief sought.2
In Spanel v. Mounds View School District,' decided in 1962, the
Minnesota Supreme Court prospectively abolished municipal tort immunity and attacked headlong the doctrine's arbitrary distinctions,
sparing only discretionary governmental activities and judicial, quasijudicial, legislative, and quasi-legislative functions.2 The court noted
that comparable private institutions have suffered no undue hardships
from exposure to tort liability and proposed that municipalities would
likewise be able to tolerate such liability." By announcing its intention
in Spanel to abolish municipal immunity in the future, the court invited
the legislature to act and suggested several provisions that might be
Others gradually followed the Massachusetts lead. See, e.g., Dosdall v. County of
Olmsted, 30 Minn. 96,14 N.W. 458 (1882); Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 458 (N.Y.
1842).
18. See, e.g., Bank v. Brainerd School Dist., 49 Minn. 106, 51 N.W. 814 (1892) (school
districts); Altnow v. Town of Sibley, 30 Minn. 186, 14 N.W. 877 (1883) (towns); Dosdall
v. County of Olmsted, 30 Minn. 96, 14 N.W. 458 (1882) (counties).
19. See, e.g., Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 437-38, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261-62
(1953) (municipal liquor stores subject to dramshop act); Smith v. City of Cloquet, 120
Minn. 50, 139 N.W. 141 (1912) (city liable for injuries from undue accumulations of ice
and snow on sidewalks); MINN. STAT. § 123.41 (1976) (school districts may waive immunity
to the extent of permissible liability insurance). The largest exception was created by the
distinction between proprietary and governmental functions, whereby tort immunity protected municipalities in the performance of governmental but not proprietary functions.
See Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota (pt. 1), 26 MINN. L.
REv. 293, 295-96, 334-58 (1942).
20. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1885, ch. 7, § 19, 1885 Minn. Special Laws 74.
21. Act of Apr. 23, 1897, ch. 248, § 1, 1897 Minn. Laws 459.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
25. Id. at 292-93, 118 N.W.2d at 803. See generally Note, The DiscretionaryException
and Municipal Tort Liability: A Reappraisal,52 MINN. L. Ray. 1047 (1968).
26. 264 Minn. at 291, 118 N.W.2d at 802-03.
27. Id. at 281, 118 N.W.2d at 796. State tort immunity was prospectively abolished in
the same manner. See Neiting v. Blondell, Minn. -,
235 N.W.2d 597 (1975). As
with municipal liability, the Minnesota Legislature has acted to abolish certain state
immunities in light of Neiting. See MINN. STAT. § 3.736 (1976).
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included in a tort liability law, including a notice requirement. 8 This
invitation was quickly accepted; in 1963 the Minnesota Municipal Tort
Liability Act was enacted.' The Act contained a thirty-day notice provision, which survived until 1974 when it was increased to sixty days, 30 and
the present 180-day requirement was adopted in 1976.31
Under the present Minnesota notice statute, notice must include the
place, time, and circumstances of the injury, but defects in compensa32
tion or other relief demanded may be corrected after notice is given.
In addition, written notice is not required if the municipality obtains
actual notice of the injury within the notice period.13 Moreover, an extension of up to ninety days is granted to claimants incapacitated by
the injury."
The Minnesota Supreme Court has enunciated at least four reasons
for allowing municipalities to limit their tort liability through the notice
requirement. First, notice provides an opportunity to investigate claims
while facts are fresh and witnesses readily available.3 Notice also protects against stale or fraudulent claims and the connivance of public
officials." The third reason is to enable the correction of deficient municipal facilities and functions before more people suffer injuries. 7 Finally, notice affords an opportunity for negotiation and settlement without litigation." While these justifications have been endorsed by the
courts in Minnesota and elsewhere, 3' legislative and judicial exceptions
have developed to mitigate the harshness of the notice requirement. 4" In
addition, a small number of courts have taken a more drastic approach
and have abolished their states' notice statutes on constitutional
grounds." The following section will analyze these developments in
more detail.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

264
Act
Act
Act

Minn. at 293, 118 N.W.2d at 804.
of May 22, 1963, ch. 798, §§ 1-17, 1963 Minn. Laws 1396.
of Mar. 28, 1974, ch. 311, § 1, 1974 Minn. Laws 518.
of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 264, § 4, 1976 Minn. Laws 969.
MINN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1976).
Id.
Id.
E.g., Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207 (1966).
Id. at 79, 143 N.W.2d at 208.
Id. at 79, 143 N.W.2d at 207-08.
Id. at 79, 143 N.W.2d at 207.

39. See, e.g., Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 417, 422-23 (1975) (justifications for notice requirement have as their

underlying basis the protection of the public coffers, with only an ancillary concern for
public safety).
40. See notes 42-106 infra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 107 & 115 infra.
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III.

JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS OF THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENT

Historically, the Minnesota Supreme Court has given a strict construction to the notice requirement,'" leaving modification to the legislature.'3 Thus, notice has been considered a condition precedent to suit"
and plaintiffs have been denied recovery for mere technical violations
of the requirement.' 5 Trivial noncompliance with the statute sometimes

has barred plaintiffs' claims despite bad faith or even fraudulent misrepresentation by the municipality." Interpretation of the notice statute
has not been uniformly strict, however. Exceptions for incapacitated

persons, principles of waiver and estoppel, the substantial compliance
doctrine, and suggestions by the Minnesota court that it will hold the
statute unconstitutional cumulatively have eliminated much of the
harshness inherent in the notice requirement.
A.

Incapacity

Unduly severe consequences occur when a plaintiff is unable to give
42. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Duluth, 140 Minn. 303, 305, 168 N.W. 20, 21 (1918)
(description of place of accident 25 feet in error held an inaccurate description); Olcott v.
City of St. Paul, 91 Minn. 207, 209-10, 97 N.W. 879, 880-81 (1904) (after proclaiming that
notice statute should be construed with "reasonable liberality," a description in the notice
of the sidewalk as icy, smooth, and defective held insufficient when complaint also alleged
the defective character resulted from holes and decay of sidewalk); Doyle v. City of
Duluth, 74 Minn. 157, 161, 76 N.W. 1029, 1030 (1898) (notice void when served upon
mayor rather than municipal governing body).
43. See, e.g., Jensen v. Downtown Auto Park, Inc., 289 Minn. 436, 438-39, 184 N.W.2d
777, 778 (1971) (legislative acquiesence indicates approval); Olson v. City of Virginia, 211
Minn. 64, 66, 300 N.W. 42, 43 (1941) ("matters concerning the hardship and injustice of
[notice] legislation are for legislative and not judicial consideration").
44. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 370, 137 N.W.2d 674, 679 (1965) ("The
more precise characterization of the notice requirement is that it is a condition precedent
to bringing suit for the practical purpose of quickly informing a municipality of injuries
for which it might be liable."); Freeman v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 202, 204, 17
N.W.2d 364, 365 (1945) ("The statutt imposes a requirement as a condition precedent to
bringing suit against a municipality by an injured party claiming damages for tortious
injury that he first present a notice of claim in writing to the governing body of the city.");
Szroka v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 171 Minn. 57, 59, 213 N.W. 557, 558 (1927) ("In
many cases it is said that the giving of notice is a condition precedent to a cause of
action.").
45. See cases cited in note 42 supra.
46. See, e.g., McGuire v. Hennessy, 292 Minn. 429, 431, 193 N.W.2d 313, 314 (1971)
(notice not effective until received by city council despite timely notice given to city
attorney who held it beyond notice period before giving it to city council); Hirth v. Village
of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 143 N.W.2d 205 (1966) (municipal hospital fraudulently
concealed fact that unauthorized treatment caused amputation of plaintiff's legs); Johnson v. City of Chisholm, 222 Minn. 179, 185-86, 24 N.W.2d 232, 236 (1946) (city not
estopped from asserting faulty notice defense despite misrepresentation by city officials
to plaintiff about necessity of filing notice).
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notice because of incapacity and consequently is barred by the notice
requirement. Especially onerous are those situations where the incapacity results from the very injury that gives rise to the plaintiffs cause of
action. Many jurisdictions nonetheless make no exception for this unfortunate class," while other jurisdictions, more sensitive to the problems
faced by such plaintiffs, have grafted exceptions for incapacitated persons. 8 Minnesota is among the states that grant exceptional treatment
for persons incapacitated by the injury, allowing them an extension of
up to ninety days to give notice.49
Despite the ninety-day extension, the problems faced by incapacitated plaintiffs in Minnesota have by no means been eradicated. For
example, the court has held that the extension is available only if the
plaintiff was unable to cause another to give notice in his stead.5 Furthermore, notice by incapacitated plaintiffs is extended only for the
time of incapacity, with the ninety-day period representing the maximum. 51 In addition, minors, despite legal incapacity, do not fall within
the ninety-day extension provision.2 Finally, incapacity is a fact ques47. See, e.g., City of Birmingham v. Weston, 233 Ala. 563, 567, 172 So. 643, 646 (1937)
(failure to file notice against city within required period is not excused because injured
person was under ten years of age and was mentally and physically unable to give notice);
Sherfey v. City of Brazil, 213 Ind. 493, 503, 13 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1938) (fact that claimant
is an infant or is under mental or physical disabilities does not relieve him from the
requirement of giving timely notice); Workman v. City of Emporia, 200 Kan. 112, 117,
434 P.2d 846, 850 (1967) (notice requirement as applied to an incompetent claimant does
not violate due process).
48. Some state statutes except incapacitated plaintiffs. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §
613A.5 (West Supp. 1976); ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.275(3) (1953). Some states have judicially
created exceptions for incapacitated plaintiffs. See, e.g., Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403
P.2d 34, 37 (Alas. 1965) (plaintiff incapacitated because of electrocution); Burkard v. City
of Dell Rapids, 76 S.D. 56, 59-60, 72 N.W.2d 308, 309 (1955) (incapacitated claimant not
required to give timely notice where city was performing a proprietary function).
49. See note 1 supra. Early municipal charters contained similar provisions. See, e.g.,
Ray v. City of St. Paul, 44 Minn. 340, 342, 46 N.W. 675, 676 (1890) (to come within this
exception, claimant must prove "that his mental operations were so impaired, either
through his physical condition or as the result of medical treatment required thereby, as
to disqualify him from attending to, or giving needful directions in respect to, the notice"
during the period of claimed incapacity). The first uniform incapacity exception in Minnesota was enacted in 1959. See Act of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 599, § 1, 1959 Minn. Laws 971.
50. See Wibstad v. City of Hopkins, 291 Minn. 206, 209, 190 N.W.2d 125, 127 (1971);
cf. Holsman v. Village of Bigfork, 284 Minn. 460, 462, 172 N.W.2d 320, 321-22 (1969)
(minor not incapacitated by reason of minority; parents can still give notice).
51. See Wibstad v. City of Hopkins, 291 Minn. 206, 209, 190 N.W.2d 125, 126-27 (1971).
52. See Holsman v. Village of Bigfork, 284 Minn. 460, 462, 172 N.W.2d 320, 321-22
(1969) (mother could have given notice); Szroka v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 171 Minn.
57, 60-61, 213 N.W. 557, 558 (1927) (incapacity statute only excepted claimants incapacitated by the injury and minors are not incapacitated for that reason). The weight of
authority from other jurisdictions is to the contrary, holding minority to be incapacity
excepted from notice. See, e.g., Wills v. Metz, 89 Ill. App. 2d 334, 337, 231 N.E.2d 628,
630 (1967) (minor twenty years old); Fornaro v. Town of Clarkstown, 44 App. Div. 2d 596,
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tion which "manifestly intends a case-by-case determination. "' 5 Therefore, the extension is of little assistance to a person who is incapacitated
for longer than 270 days, who could have caused notice to be given by a
third party, or who is a minor.
The inherent unfairness of a notice provision that can bar an incapacitated person from recovery is obvious and the justifications for the notice requirement" seem singularly unconvincing in such a case, especially where the municipality's negligence causes a serious injury. Although the Minnesota Legislature has taken steps in recent years to
alleviate the harshness of the notice requirement in incapacity cases by
extending the notice period,55 a more just and comprehensive approach
might be to waive notice for the entire period of incapacity. 6 If the
legislature does not take such action, the court might consider following
the lead of several other courts, discussed elsewhere in this Note, and
hold the notice statute unconstitutional as applied to incapacitated
plaintiffs. 7
B.

Waiver and Estoppel

A second possible exception to the notice requirement involves the
doctrines of waiver and estoppel. A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment
of a known right,58 and therefore generally only is available where the
municipal governing body votes to excuse notice for a particular claimant.5 9 Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, has been found where the
plaintiff has justifiably relied to his detriment upon actions of the municipality." The two doctrines often are used interchangeably," how353 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1974) (child of 13 years presumed not to know his legal rights). But

see Goncalves v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 166 Cal. App. 2d 87, 90-91, 332 P.2d
713, 715 (1958). See generally 18 E. McQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 53.159 (rev. 3d ed. 1963). At least one court has extended legal incapacity to include
inability to obtain legal representation. See Torres v. Jersey City Medical Center, 140 N.J.
Super. 323, 327, 356 A.2d 75, 77 (1976) (construing statute giving court discretion to permit
late notice). Another court has regarded incarceration in a jail as constituting incapacity.
See Green v. Department of Corrections, 30 Mich. App. 2d 648, 659, 186 N.W.2d 792, 798,
aff'd, 386 Mich. 459, 192 N.W.2d 491 (1971).
53. Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 428, 212 N.W.2d 361, 367 (1973).
54. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text.
55. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
56. This could be achieved by adopting a notice statute similar to that in New York
and several other states, giving discretion to the trial judge to forgive late notice when
justice requires. See notes 197-203 infra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 110-21 infra and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Alsleben v. Oliver Corp., 254 Minn. 197, 203, 94 N.W.2d 354, 358 (1959)
(waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right and the necessary knowledge
may be actual or constructive).
59. See, e.g., Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 78, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207
(1966) (can be no waiver of notice except by formal action of the governing body of the
municipality).
60. See, e.g., Brooks v. City of Miami, 161 So. 2d 675, 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
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ever, with waiver being found because of conduct of municipal employees, even though the governing body did not excuse notice and a waiver
was not intended.2 In such cases, the technically proper approach would
be to apply the estoppel doctrine, although in most of these cases the
result probably would be the same. 3
The waiver and estoppel theories have not been widely accepted in
notice cases;"' the courts generally have reasoned that the notice statute
is not susceptible to such judicial exceptions. 5 In recent years, however,
a sense of fairness and justice has provoked a trend toward allowing an
exception based on these theories. Minnesota case law is illustrative.
In Leier v. Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission,7 the
plaintiff was injured on one of defendant's buses. Two days later, defendant's claims adjuster telephoned and advised the plaintiff not to
hire an attorney and to let the defendant handle the claim. The plaintiff
subsequently submitted late notice, but the Minnesota Supreme Court
nonetheless held that the defendant was estopped from invoking the
defense of untimely notice.
The Leier decision changed the Minnesota court's previous position
prohibiting estoppel." Leier, however, also appears to have placed some
(city is estopped unless it scrupulously avoids actions which might prejudice claimant in
giving notice); City of Waco v. Thralls, 172 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943) (city
estopped because of its longstanding policy of paying injured employees regardless of
liability, where that policy caused claimant-employee not to give notice).
61. See 31 MINN. L. REv. 751, 752 (1947).
62. See, e.g., Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So. 2d 9, 12-13 (Fla. 1965)
(actual notice of the plaintiff's injury by the municipality held to waive notice requirement); Housewright v. City of LaHarpe, 51 Ill. 2d 357, 362, 282 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1972)
(purchase of municipal liability insurance held to waive notice requirement).
63. Compare, e.g., Lindley v. City of Detroit, 131 Mich. 8, 10, 90 N.W. 665, 665-66
(1902) with, e.g., Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So. 2d 9, 12-13 (Fla.
1965).
64. See, e.g., Fry v. Willamalane Park & Recreation Dist., 4 Ore. App. 575, 584, 481
P.2d 648, 653 (1971); Rabe v. Outagamie County, 72 Wis. 2d 492, 501, 241 N.W.2d 428,
433 (1976); cf. Aune v. City of Mandan, 167 N.W.2d 754, 759-60 (N.D. 1969) (estoppel
also inapplicable to six-month statute of limitation in notice statute).
65. See, e.g., Heck v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 609, 88 N.W.2d 58, 63 (1958) (the
doctrine of waiver "would virtually nullify the statutory requirement of service upon the
municipality").
66. Compare, e.g., Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205,
208 (1966) (municipality cannot be estopped from asserting improper notice defense because to do so "would be to undermine the purposes of the statute and invade the legislative prerogative") with, e.g., Leier v. Twin City Area Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 299
Minn. 35, 216 N.W.2d 129 (1974) (estoppel doctrine applied in notice case to avoid unjust
result).
67. 299 Minn. 35, 216 N.W.2d 129 (1974).
68. Id. at 37-38, 216 N.W.2d at 130.
69. See Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207 (1966)
(only formal action by municipal governing body can constitute waiver or estoppel); Olson
v. City of Virginia, 211 Minn. 64, 67, 300 N.W. 42, 44 (1941) (requirements of notice statute
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limitations on the estoppel theory. Apparently, the acts which form the
grounds for estoppel must occur within the notice period. 0 In addition,
the plaintiff probably must actually serve notice upon the defendant
even though late. 7 Consequently, while Leier is a relatively liberal decision, it is limited to its "unique fact situation."7" The doctrine of estoppel is an equitable one, however, and in a case where the equities so
require, the court might well allow the doctrine to be invoked even when
the requirements alluded to in Leier have not been met."
C.

Substantial Compliance

The most common and significant method of easing the often calamitous effects of the notice requirement is by the doctrine of substantial
compliance. Courts frequently announce that notice requirements are to
be liberally construed7" and that technically deficient notice which substantially complies with the statutory requirements is sufficient.75 This
is consistent with the trend away from governmental immunity" and the
favored as the judicial exception least offensive to
doctrine generally 7is
7
the notice statute.
In Minnesota, the concept of substantial compliance has evolved in
two stages. Prior to 1972, the doctrine had been erratically applied and
usually was limited to defects in the form and content of notice and
manner of service." Because a function of notice is to expedite municicannot be supplied through waiver or estoppel).
70. See Leier v. Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 299 Minn. 35, 37, 216
N.W.2d 129. 130 (1974); Johnson v. City of Chisholm, 222 Minn. 179, 186, 24 N.W.2d 232,
236 (1946).
71. See Leier v. Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 299 Minn. 35, 37, 216
N.W.2d 129, 130 (1974).
72. Id.
73. See generally 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 802, 805 (4th ed. 1941).
74. See, e.g., Grams v. Independent School Dist., 286 Minn. 481, 489, 176 N.W.2d 536,
541 (1970); Brown v. City of Chattanooga, 180 Tenn. 284, 288, 174 S.W.2d 466, 468 (1943);
Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 164 Wis. 77, 80, 159 N.W. 581, 582 (1916).
75. See, e.g., Oakley v. State, 54 Haw. 210, 217, 505 P.2d 1182, 1186 (1973); Galbreath
v. City of Indianapolis, 253 Ind. 472, 477-78, 255 N.E.2d 225, 228-29 (1970); Croft v. Gulf
& Western Indus., Inc., 12 Ore. App. 507, 514, 506 P.2d 541, 545 (1973).
76. In 1957, Florida became the first jurisdiction to abrogate municipal tort immunity.
See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133-34 (Fla. 1957). This trend since
has steadily gained momentum. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131,
at 985-86 (4th ed. 1971). In addition to abrogation of municipal immunity, it has been
limited in other jurisdictions through exceptions. See note 19 supra.
77. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court, traditionally strict in its interpretation
of the notice statute, applied substantial compliance as early as 1889. See Harder v. City
of Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 446, 42 N.W. 350 (1889). In contrast, municipal misrepresentations and other conduct by municipal defendants was not held to create an estoppel
until 1974. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
78. Prior to 1972, substantial compliance had been employed generally only to accomodate errors or omissions in the description of the time, place, and circumstances of the
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pal investigations," defects in form, content, and manner of service
which did not substantially hinder municipal defendants in ascertaining
the time, place, and circumstances of the injury had often, but not
uniformly,8° been allowed."' In contrast, defects in timeliness always
barred claims because late notice inevitably delays investigation. 2
Since 1972, a line of cases beginning with Olander v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,"3 has vigorously embraced and expanded the doctrine of substantial compliance in Minnesota. Olander eliminated the prior confusion concerning description of the time, place, and circumstances of the
injury. See, e.g., Russell v. City of Minneapolis, 259 Minn. 355, 357, 107 N.W.2d 711, 713
(1961) (six- to 15-foot error in description of place of injury permissible); Murphy v. City
of St. Paul, 130 Minn. 410, 153 N.W. 619 (1915) (time of accident one day in error held
acceptable); Harder v. City of Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 446, 449, 42 N.W. 350, 351 (1889)
(one-block error in description of place of injury permissible). But see Hampton v. City
of Duluth, 140 Minn. 303, 305, 168 N.W. 20, 21 (1918) (25-foot error in description of place
invalidates notice). Substantial compliance has likewise been held sufficient in describing
the nature of the defect. See, e.g., Piscor v. Village of Hibbing, 169 Minn. 478, 482, 211
N.W. 952, 953 (1927) (notice need not be as accurate as pleadings in describing defect).
But see Olcott v. City of St. Paul, 91 Minn. 207, 209-10, 97 N.W. 879, 880-81 (1904)
(insufficient description of injury-causing defect). Substantial compliance also has been
acceptable to the extent the municipality is not thereby prejudiced. See Brittain v. City
of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 383, 84 N.W.2d 646, 651 (1957); Terryll v. City of Faribault, 81 Minn. 519, 84 N.W. 458 (1900), af/'d second appeal, 84 Minn. 341, 87 N.W.
917 (1901); cf. Louko v. Village of Hibbing, 222 Minn. 463, 466, 25 N.W.2d 234, 235 (1946)
(notice as to place sufficient if municipal authorities, through exercise of reasonable diligence, are able to discover location).
Substantial compliance, however, has been more grudgingly invoked with regard to the
manner of service requirement. See, e.g., Grams v. Independent School Dist., 286 Minn.
481, 491, 176 N.W.2d 536, 542 (1970) (service upon superintendent of school district
sufficient); Hebert v. Village of Hibbing, 170 Minn. 211, 212 N.W. 186 (1927) (service of
notice upon village recorder sufficient); Peterson v. Village of Cokato, 84 Minn. 205, 208,
87 N.W. 615, 616-17 (1901) (same). But see McGuire v. Hennessy, 292 Minn. 429, 431,
193 N.W.2d 313, 315 (1971) (city attorney not appropriate official upon whom to serve
notice); Aronson v. City of St. Paul, 193 Minn. 34, 36, 257 N.W. 662, 663 (1934) (mayor
not appropriate official upon whom to serve notice); Doyle v. City of Duluth, 74 Minn.
157, 161, 76 N.W. 1029, 1030 (1898) (same). The Minnesota court has also permitted
substantial compliance with regard to the requirement concerning amount of compensation demanded. See Ackeret v. City of Minneapolis, 129 Minn. 190, 196-97, 151 N.W. 976,
978 (1915) (notice sufficient despite failure to specify separate damages of parent arising
from injury to child). But see Olson v. City of Virginia, 211 Minn. 64, 66, 300 N.W. 42, 43
(1941) (notice with no compensation demanded is void); Bausher v. City of St. Paul, 72
Minn. 539, 75 N.W. 745 (1898) (notice must state amount of compensation demanded, as
well as specifying type of relief sought).
79. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Duluth, 140 Minn. 303, 305, 168 N.W. 20, 21 (1918)
(25-foot error in description of place of injury invalidates notice).
81. See, e.g., Russell v. City of Minneapolis, 259 Minn. 355, 357, 107 N.W.2d 711, 713
(1961) (six- to 15-foot error in description of place of injury is permissible).
82. See, e.g., Almich v. Independent School Dist., 291 Minn. 269, 272, 190 N.W.2d 668,
670 (1971); Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207 (1966).
83. 293 Minn. 162, 197 N.W.2d 438 (1972).
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injury. In overruling prior inconsistent opinions, the court held that,
except for the elements of timeliness and manner of service, substantial
compliance with the notice provision is sufficient." The court further
stated that the test of substantial compliance is reasonablenness; if the
reasonable diligence of the municipality could have supplied the information omitted in the notice, the municipality is not thereby prejudiced
and the notice is sufficient. 5
In Seifert v. City of Minneapolis," the Olander reasoning was expanded to include the manner of service within the substantial compliance doctrine. Notice was held valid despite service upon an alderman
at his home after business hours. The court reasoned that notice need
only reach a responsible municipal official who is reasonably likely to
place it before the municipal governing body. 7 In Seifert, the court
implicitly acknowledged the insignificance of the short delay caused by
technically improper service when compared to the injustice of barring
legitimate claims."
The precedent of Olanderand Seifert, and undoubtedly the intervening amendment of the notice requirement from thirty to sixty days,8 '
facilitated the extension of substantial compliance to the element of
timeliness. In Jenkins v. Board of Education,N the minor plaintiff was
injured in a schoolyard fight and was immediately assisted by the principal and school nurse, who, the following day, filed a detailed report
with the school administration." Notice submitted six days late was
held substantially to comply with the statute because the delay was
short in relation to the notice period, the principal was immediately
aware of the injury, the principal's report was filed the day after the
injury, and the official who received the report from the principal was
the school district's designated agent for receiving notice. 2
The court in Jenkins observed that the notice statute had been
amended in 1974,'1 subsequent to the plaintiff's injury,' to make actual
notice of the injury by the municipality or its insurer sufficient to satisfy
the notice requirement. 5 Although not applying the actual notice
84. Id. at 169-70, 197 N.W.2d at 442.
85. Id. at 170, 197 N.W.2d at 442.
86. 298 Minn. 35, 213 N.W.2d 605 (1973).

87. Id. at 42, 213 N.W.2d at 609.
88. See id.
89. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
90. 303 Minn. 437, 228 N.W.2d 265 (1975).

91. Id. at 438, 228 N.W.2d at 267.
92. Id. at 440-41, 228 N.W.2d at 268.
93. Id. at 440, 228 N.W.2d at 268.

94. The injury to the claimant in Jenkins occurred on January 6, 1972. Id. at 438, 228
N.W.2d at 267.
95. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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amendment retroactively," the court reasoned that the rationale of the
amendment and the policies underlying Olander and Seifert mandated
that the substantial compliance doctrine be applied to the timeliness
requirement. 7 However, because the municipality in Jenkins did have
actual notice of the injury within the notice period, the case does not
resolve the issue whether, absent actual notice, substantial compliance
with the timeliness element is-sufficient. The Jenkins court emphasized
that, through the accident report, the municipality was put on notice
of the possibility of suit," thus indicating some actual notice is needed
for the application of the substantial compliance doctrine to cases involving late notice. This interpretation was reinforced in Kelly v. City
of Rochester," which also arose prior to the actual notice amendment.
In Kelly the court, relying on Jenkins, found substantial compliance
despite late written notice because an accident report had been filed
with the city by a city employee within the notice period, 10 thereby
giving the municipality actual notice. Therefore, Jenkins and Kelly both
can be read as allowing substantial compliance with the timeliness element only where actual notice is present and thus as having no application in cases arising after the actual notice amendment went into effect.
In Schaefer v. City of Bloomington, 0' however, the court seemed to
invoke the substantial compliance doctrine against a county where no
actual or written notice was given within the required notice period.
Schaefer may be of only limited applicability, though, because the accident was caused by a facility under the joint control of the county and
city and the city had been given proper notice. The court simply imputed the city's notice
to the county, observing that the county was not
02
thereby prejudiced.
Consequently, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet invoked
substantial compliance in a situation where the municipality received
no actual or imputed notice within the required period. The court in
recent years clearly has shown a willingness to invoke the substantial
compliance doctrine when necessary to avoid injustice 0 3 and thus probably would be willing to apply the doctrine in any case where the municipality by reasonable diligence could have obtained actual notice within
the notice period. 0'° However, it seems unlikely that the court would
96. See MINN. STAT. § 645.21 (1976) ("No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless
clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.").
97. See 303 Minn. at 439, 228 N.W.2d at 267.
98. See id. at 441, 228 N.W.2d at 268-69.
99. 304 Minn. 328, 231 N.W.2d 275 (1975).
100. Id. at 332, 231 N.W.2d at 277.
101. Minn. __,
244 N.W.2d 45 (1976).
102. See id. at -,
244 N.W.2d at 46.
103. See notes 83-102 supra and accompanying text.
104. Cf. Louko v. Village of Hibbing, 222 Minn. 463, 466, 25 N.W.2d 234, 235 (1946)
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ignore completely the time limitations of the notice statute and invoke
the substantial compliance doctrine in a case where no actual or imputed notice occurs within the notice period or where the municipality,
through its own efforts, could not reasonably have obtained notice. 05
Thus, the substantial compliance doctrine, while it has alleviated much
of the harshness of the notice statute,'14 does appear to have definite
limitations and in cases where the doctrine is not available, and the
grounds for waiver or estoppel are not present, the only alternatives
available to the court would be to hold the statute unconstitutional or
to deny relief.
D.

ConstitutionalAttack

Another means of mitigating the harshness of the notice requirement
is to eliminate completely the requirement of notice on grounds that it
is unconstitutional. Constitutional attacks have been based upon due
process and equal protection and have been endorsed by four states"°
and a number of commentators.' In addition, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has hinted strongly on several occasions that it will find the re(notice as to place of injury is sufficient if municipal authorities, through exercise of
reasonable diligence, are able to discover location).
105. See, e.g., Freeman v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 202, 205, 17 N.W.2d 364, 365
(1945) ("It is not for the courts to pass upon the merits, wisdom and justice of legislation.
So long as the legislature does not transgress constitutional limits, matters concerning the
hardship and injustice of legislation are for legislative and not judicial consideration.").
106. One remaining area in which the substantial compliance doctrine should apply is
that concerning the problems faced by third-party plaintiffs seeking contribution or indemnity from municipalities. For example, if a defendant is sued for an injury which he
believes was the responsibility, in whole or in part, of a municipality, he may wish to join
the municipality as a third-party defendant. However, the third-party plaintiff may not
have been aware of the injury within the notice period, and if the plaintiff did not give
the municipality notice, the third-party plaintiffs claim against the municipality may be
barred. In Minnesota, the court has consistently held that in such cases the third-party
plaintiff may not join the municipality. See, e.g., American Auto Ins. Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 259 Minn. 294, 298, 107 N.W.2d 320, 323 (1961). The better view, adopted
by most courts, permits the third-party plaintiff to join the municipality despite improper
notice, since he has no control over whether the municipality receives notice and should
not have his rights made contingent upon the plaintiff giving notice. See, e.g., Olsen v.
Jones, 209 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa 1974); Cotham v. Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 556,
567, 273 A.2d 115, 120-21 (1971); Geiger v. Calumet County, 18 Wis. 2d 151, 156-57, 118
N.W.2d 197, 200 (1962); Note, Notice of Claim Under the Municipal Tort Claim Act-The
Watchdog with Plenty of Teeth, 23 DRAKE L. REv. 670, 672 (1974).
107. See Reich v. State Highway Dept., 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner
v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973); Hunter v. North
Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975); O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg,
W. Va. , 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
108. See Note, supra note 39; Note, Noll v. Bozeman: Notice of Claim Provision in
Montana, 37 MONT. L. REv. 206 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Notice Provisions in
Montana]; Comment, The Constitutionality of California's Public Entity Tort Claim
Statutes, 6 PAc. L.J. 30 (1975).
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quirement constitutionally infirm.' 9 Yet, as the following discussion
indicates, most courts have rejected the constitutional attacks, and the
reasons for rejection are not entirely without merit.
1. Due Process
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is designed, in
part, to ensure that procedural requirements for judicial proceedings are
fair."' Several courts have held that notice statutes, as applied to incapacitated and minor claimants, violate procedural due process.", These
courts have reasoned that incapacitated and minor claimants cannot be
required to do that which is clearly impossible as a condition precedent
to suit."' This procedural due process argument, however, is only available for physically and legally incapacitated claimants and therefore is
of somewhat limited utility."3 A more fundamental due process attack
109. In Olander v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 293 Minn. 162, 197 N.W.2d 438 (1972),
the court, after reviewing its decisions finding the notice statute constitutional, noted that
"judicial patience should not be confused with judicial impotence, especially where constitutional rights may be concerned." Id. at 164-65, 197 N.W.2d at 440. The issue was next
raised in Altendorfer v. Jandric, Inc., 294 Minn. 475, 199 N.W.2d 812 (1972), with the
defendant's contention that it was unconstitutional to require notice to join a municipality
as a third-party defendant. Declining to pass on the constitutionality issue, the court
nonetheless noted that "[ulnlike an issue of purely statutory construction, judicial resolution of which becomes engrafted upon the statute by subsequent inaction by the legislature, the issue of the constitutionality of a statute is not so circumscribed." Id. at 481,
199 N.W.2d at 816. Most recently, three concurring justices in Jenkins v. Board of Education, 303 Minn. 437, 442, 228 N.W.2d 265, 269 (1975) declared the notice requirement
constitutionally infirm. The court in Kelly v. City of Rochester, 304 Minn. 328, 330, 231
N.W.2d 275, 276 (1975) indicated that future constitutional attack may be on due process
grounds, and in Ebel v. Village of South International Falls, __
Minn. -,
-,
244
N.W.2d 496, 497 (1976) the court was willing to decide the constitutional issue if relief
was not obtained on remand.
110. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (procedural due process requires
a "fair process of decisionmaking" when constitutionally affected rights are involved);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (the opportunity to be heard must be
granted "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"); Railroad Comm'n v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 393 (1938) ("The right to a fair and open hearing is one of
the rudiments of fair play assurred to every litigant by the Federal Constitution as a
minimal requirement.").
111. See, e.g., Reich v. State Highway Dept., 386 Mich. 617, 622, 194 N.W.2d 700, 70102 (1972) (alternative holding); City of Tyler v. Ingram, 157 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 164 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1942); Cook v. State, 83 Wash.
2d 599, 606, 521 P.2d 725, 729 (1974). An important consideration in granting due process
relief is the period of time allowed to give notice. Deprivation of due process becomes less
likely as the time period for notice increases. Compare Ocampo v. City of Racine, 28 Wis.
2d 506, 513, 137 N.W.2d 477, 481 (1965) (120-day notice period not unreasonable) with
Hughes v. City of Fond du Lac, 73 Wis. 380, 382, 41 N.W. 407, 408 (1889) (five-day notice
period unreasonable).
112. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 599, 604, 521 P.2d 725, 728 (1974).
113. See Shearer v. Perry Community School Dist., 236 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Iowa 1975),
where the court held the notice statute did not violate the due process but also observed
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on notice statutes has been made on substantive due process grounds.
Under substantive due process principles a statute is invalid if it is
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable." 4 In Grubaugh v. City of St.
Johns"' the Michigan Supreme Court employed a substantive due process approach, holding the notice statute unconstitutional because it
arbitrarily and unreasonably deprived claimants of a vested property
right." ' In Grubaugh the claimants were minors,"' but the court's reasoning has been applied to adults as well." 8 The rationale invoked by
the Grubaugh court basically was that under Michigan's municipal tort
liability law, liability for municipal negligence arises at the time the tort
occurs, thereby vesting the claimant with an immediate property
right."9 As a result, the court held that notice is not a condition precedent to the municipality's liability'O and that barring a cause of action
for improper notice was an arbitrary and unreasonable deprivation of
this property right and therefore violative of due process.''
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court recently suggested it would
entertain a substantive due process argument like that utilized in
Grubaugh,2 1 such an approach may be an inappropriate means for attacking the constitutionality of the Minnesota notice statute. A rather
technical reason for this conclusion is that, in Minnesota, notice apparently is a condition precedent to liability,'23 although there is some conthat "[wie might find some difficulty in upholding § 613A.5 [the Iowa notice statute]
against a constitutional challenge if it were shown the condition attached to the right of
action was so unreasonable as to render compliance almost impossible or to give an injured
person, in essence, no right of recovery." Thus, virtual exclusion of a remedy seems to be
necessary before this due process argument will apply, and that is likely to occur only in
cases where the claimant is incapacitated and thereby is rendered unable to give notice.
114. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934); Hylen v. Owens, Minn. -,
-,
251 N.W.2d 858, 861 (1977); cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446
(1973) (irrebuttable presumption, created by a statute, arbitrarily and unreasonably
caused a deprivation of property in violation of due process).
115. 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
116. Id. at 176, 180 N.W.2d at 783-84.
117. Id. at 167, 180 N.W.2d at 780.
118. See Howell v. Lazaruk, 32 Mich. App. 548, 555, 189 N.W.2d 50, 54 (1971);-O'Neil
v. City of Parkersburg, W. Va. , -,
237 S.E.2d 504, 509 (1977). In O'Neil,
however, the court based its decision primarily on equal protection grounds, with its due
process discussion representing either dictum or an alternative holding. In addition,
O'Neil is unique in that the notice statute involved granted only 30 days to give notice,
an unusually short time, and that obviously affected the court's decision. See notes 18889 infra and accompanying text.
119. 384 Mich. at 171-74, 180 N.W.2d at 781-83.
120. Id. at 173-75, 180 N.W.2d at 782-84.
121. Id.
122. See Kelly v. City of Rochester, 304 Minn. 328, 330, 231 N.W.2d 275, 276 (1975).
But see Altendorfer v. Jandric, Inc., 294 Minn. 475, 480-81, 199 N.W.2d 812, 816 (1972)
(Grubaugh rationale inconsistent with existing Minnesota law).
123. See, e.g., Holsman v. Village of Bigfork, 284 Minn. 460, 462, 172 N.W.2d 320, 321
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flict on this point."4 Consequently, a vested property right to a cause of
action against the municipality might not arise in Minnesota until notice is given and therefore no due process rights would commence prior
to the giving of notice.'25 At least one other court recently applied such
reasoning in holding a notice statute not to be violative of due process.",
A more basic reason for rejecting the substantive due process attack
is the recent decline of substantive due process and the concurrent rise
of equal protection analysis.' The modern judicial trend has been to
analyze the substantive validity of statutes that create classifications on
equal protection grounds,' while limiting due process analysis primarily to the issue of procedural safeguards.'29
Although substantive due process has by no means been abandoned,'11
(1969) ("It is settled that the requirement of notice to the municipality, even by an injured
minor, is an essential part of the cause of action.").
124. See White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 370-71, 137 N.W.2d 674, 679 (1965) (municipal duty to exercise due care is breached at time injury occurs and thus its liability accrues
not upon service of notice but rather upon commission of the tort). But see id. at 374, 137
N.W.2d at 681 (Otis, J., dissent) (plaintiffs cause of action cannot arise until service of
notice).
125. See, e.g., Shearer v. Perry Community School Dist., 236 N.W.2d 688, 692-93 (Iowa
1975).
126. When interpreting a municipal tort liability statute similar to that in Minnesota,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.5 (West Supp. 1977), the Iowa Supreme Court held that the right
of action is coextensive with, and no broader than, the notice requirement. See Shearer
v. Perry Community School Dist., 236 N.W.2d 688, 692-93 (Iowa 1975).
127. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1131-32 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments] (if the case is an appropriate one for
equal protection analysis, substantive due process analysis should not be invoked). See
generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALF. L. REv. 341
(1949) (leading article predicting the rise of equal protection analysis to replace substantive due process).
128. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972); McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 806-11 (1969). See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra
note 127.
129. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). One such procedural issue is access to
the courts. The Supreme Court has held that such access cannot be denied if (1) courts
provide the only available method of redress, and (2) the rights for which redress is sought
are "basic." Compare United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443-46 (1973) (filing fees are
valid as a condition to discharge a voluntary bankruptcy; eliminating debt not a basic
right) with Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-77 (1971) (judicial proceeding is the
only effective means of dissolving a marriage and the associational rights involved in
marriage are constitutionally fundamental). Notice requirements have been held to deny
access to the courts in violation of due process on this basis under circumstances where
plaintiffs are unable to give notice. See notes 110-13 supra and accompanying text.
130. The application of substantative due process to economic regulation has long been
severely restricted. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 503,531-39 (1934). See generally McCloskey, Economic Due
Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
However, the incorporation of many of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights into the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss1/3

16

et al.: Notice of Claim Requirement Under the Minnesota Municipal Tort Li
NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT

its present scope is not clearly defined, ,31 and equal protection analysis
is more specifically applicable to constitutional problems caused by
legislative classifications. 3 Thus, because the most significant constitutional question with notice statutes concerns the classification between
municipal and private defendants, as well as between claimants against
such defendants, the constitutionality of those statutes most properly
is resolved under the equal protection clause, not through substantive
33
due process.'
2.

Equal Protection
a.

Background

The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' 3' Thus, although legislation need not be
drawn with mathematical precision to ensure absolute equality, persons
similarly situated must be similarly treated and legislation cannot discriminate by creating an unconstitutional classification. 3
The United States Supreme Court generally employs one of two tests
when determining the constitutionality of legislative classifications. In
most situations, a relatively relaxed test is utilized, whereby the classification is valid so long as it is not arbitrary and bears a reasonable
relation to a legitimate governmental objective. 6 The Court normally
is easily persuaded to find the requisite reasonable relation, declaring
in McGowan v. Maryland,'31 for example, that "[tihe constitutional
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has spawned a new form of substantative
due process affecting state regulation. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
131. For a discussion of the varying interpretations regarding the scope of modem
substantive due process, see Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 1048 (1968).
132. For an early analysis of the superiority of equal protection in reviewing legislative
classifications, see Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
133. See note 127 supra. See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1955) (while due
process and equal protection are often interchangeable, discriminations apparently must
be more unjust to violate due process).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
135. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973)
(fourteenth amendment "does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages"); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (minor variations in the application
of laws to different groups are not necessarily violative of equal protection); Schwartz v.
Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 362-63, 205 N.W.2d 318, 322-23 (1973) (similarly situated persons
must be similarly treated).
136. See, e.g., Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
137. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective .... A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it."'
A second, stricter equal protection test is applied if the statutory
classification involves either a "suspect criteria,""' such as race, 10 alienage,"' and ancestry,"' or affects a "fundamental interest,' ' 3 such as
first amendment rights,' voting, "5 the right of criminal appeal,'" interstate travel," 7 procreation,' and rights of a uniquely private nature.'
These classifications are sustained only if a compelling state interest is
present' 50and if the statute is well-tailored to effectuate that interest. 5'
This two-tier equal protection formula has drawn criticism as being
too rigid and having no middle ground between its minimum scrutiny
and strict scrutiny tests.' Some recent decisions have reflected this
view by requiring a "fair and substantial" relation between the classifi138. Id. at 425-26.
139. "Suspect" criteria include a history of purposeful unequal treatment, a position
of political powerlessness, or such other disabilities as to command extraordinary protection from the political process. E.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972).
140. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
141. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
142. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
143. The test of a fundamental interest is whether the interest is expressly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution and not whether, on balance, the interest has the social
significance of another indentified fundamental interest. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1972). Moreover, the state carries a
heavy burden of justification when a statutory classification affects a fundamental interest, including proof that no less drastic means of effectuating its objective exist. See, e.g.,
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
144. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
145. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
146. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
147. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
148. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
149. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1972) (decided under due process clause).
150. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Only rarely has the Court
found a government interest powerful enough to validate a suspect criteria classification.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944) (national security was the
prevailing interest where a congressional act was subject to equal protection analysis
under the fifth amendment); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943)
(same).
151. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 127, at 1122.

152. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 8-18 (1972);
Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155, 156-60 (1973).
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cation and the legitimate governmental objective.' 53 This intermediate
test is applied to near-suspect categories or rights and has the merit of
recognizing that some interests, while not rising to the level of fundamental rights, nonetheless are sufficiently important to deserve more
protection than provided by the rational basis, minimum scrutiny
test. 54
b.

Application of the Equal Protection Standards to the Notice
Statute
i.

The Strict Scrutiny Test

Under the strict scrutiny test, a classification that affects a
"fundamental interest" can only be justified if it furthers a compelling
state interest.'55 If this test was applied to the notice statute, it seems
highly unlikely that the classifications created by the statute could be
justified, since few classifications can be justified under this test 56 and
the justifications for the notice statute are not strong. 57 However, as yet
no courts have subjected the notice requirement to the strict scrutiny
equal protection standard. It can be argued that access to the courts is
an interest fundamental to our system of justice and that therefore any
statute which substantially affects that interest, such as the notice requirement, should be required to satisfy the strict scrutiny test.' However, the right of access to the courts has yet to be recognized as a
fundamental interest for equal protection purposes and, in light of the
Supreme Court's reluctance to expand the fundamental interest category, 59 it is highly unlikely that notice statutes would be subjected to
the strict scrutiny test. Indeed, the emergence of an intermediate equal
protection standard of review appears to have hampered the expansion
of the fundamental interest category.6 0 Consequently, the strict scrutiny
test probably is not applicable to the notice requirement.
153. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
154. See generally Note, supra note 152.
155. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
156. See note 150 supra.
157. See notes 164-75 infra and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Lunday v. Vogelman, - Iowa _
,
, 213 N.W.2d 904, 908 (1973)
(Reynoldson, J., dissenting); cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 386-89 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (access to courts cannot be blocked by legislative classifications). See

generally Comment, Equal Protection and State Immunity from Tort Liability, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 716.

159. A number of interests have been promoted as fundamental but have been held not
to be by the United States Supreme Court. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1976) (age); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1972) (education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74
(1972) (housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970) (welfare benefits).
160. See Gunther, supra note 152, at 26-30.
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The Intermediate, "Fairand Substantial Relation" Test

Although of relatively recent origin,"' the intermediate, fair and substantial relation test has been applied by the Washington Supreme
Court in Hunter v. North Mason High School" 2 to strike down the
Washington notice statute. In Hunter, the court analyzed the four purported objectives of the notice requirement-investigation of claims,
correction of dangerous municipal facilities, settlement of legitimate
claims, and protection against stale claims-to determine whether the
objectives of the legislative classification are sufficient under the equal
protection standard being invoked." 3 The four justifications for the notice statute will be discussed below, in light of Hunter, to determine
their validity under the intermediate, fair and substantial relation test.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently held that
the opportunity to investigate claims is a legitimate governmental
objective sufficient to justify the distinctions drawn between municipal
and private defendants,' 64 the court in Hunter reasoned persuasively to
the contrary. The court doubted that government is any less able to
investigate accidents than is a private defendant." 5 Not only are municipalities often no larger than their private counterparts, but they also
have available the trained personnel of police departments and insurers."6 Consequently, the investigation justification is not very convincing.
The justification that notice promotes the detection and removal of
dangerous defects also is weak. Defects cause only a fraction of the
injuries giving rise to negligence suits against municipalities," 7 yet all
victims of municipal negligence must give notice. In addition, notice
only partially fulfills this justification because information is received
only from those tort victims planning to bring suit, not from everyone
injured by municipal defects."'
The governmental objective of facilitating settlement without litiga161. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
162. 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975) (en banc).
163. See id. at 815-17, 539 P.2d at 849-50.
164. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Board of Educ., 303 Minn. 437, 441-42, 228 N.W.2d 265, 269
(1975); Brittain v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 383, 84 N.W.2d 646, 651 (1957);
O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 116 Minn. 249, 251, 133 N.W. 981, 982 (1911).
165. 85 Wash. 2d at 816, 539 P.2d at 849; cf. Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich.
165, 176, 180 N.W.2d 778, 784 (1970) (same conclusion reached under due process clause).
166. 85 Wash. 2d at 816, 539 P.2d at 849.
244 N.W.2d 45,
Minn -...
167. Compare Schaefer v. City of Bloomington, 46 (1976) (bicycle wheel caught between bars of sewer grate) and Seifert v. City of Minneapolis, 298 Minn. 35, 36, 213 N.W.2d 605, 606 (1973) (plaintiff fell on defective sidewalk)
with Kelly v. City of Rochester, 304 Minn. 328, 329, 231 N.W.2d 275, 276 (1975) (injury
caused by diving accident at a municipal swimming pool) and Jenkins v. Board of Educ.,
303 Minn. 437, 438, 228 N.W.2d 265, 267 (1975) (injury caused by schoolyard fight).
168. See Note, supra note 39, at 442; Notice Provisionsin Montana, supra note 108, at
213-14.
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tion, an objective expressed at times by the Minnesota Supreme
Court,' 9 was held to be insufficient by the Washington court in
Hunter.' The Hunter court reasoned that settlement without litigation
is equally desirable in cases involving private tortfeasors, and that
therefore the imposition of the notice requirement only in cases involving municipal tortfeasors was arbitrary and unreasonable.'' Moreover,
it is not at all clear that municipalities take advantage of the early
settlement opportunities afforded by notice statutes.' The court in
Hunter also stated that the expected drain on the municipal treasury
could be avoided by municipal liability insurance.' It could have added
that protection against stale claims is provided by statutes of limitations"' and that the notice statute thwarts the legislative intent, fundamental to the abolition of governmental immunity, to spread the loss
from municipal negligence among municipal taxpayers rather than
heaping it upon unfortunate victims.'
As the above discussion indicates, the rationales in support of the
notice statute are not strong. Consequently, the Hunter court appears
to be correct in holding the statute violative of the intermediate equal
protection test. The court also seems correct in applying the intermediate, fair and substantial relation test to the notice requirement. While
the right of access to the courts for redress of a wrong is not presently
considered a fundamental right, it is sufficiently important within our
system of justice to merit being subjected to the intermediate, fair and
substantial relation test.'78 Because the notice statute affects that right,
the intermediate test therefore should be applied to the statute. If such
a test was invoked by the Minnesota court, the statute's purported
justifications probably would be found lacking, especially if the court
recognized that the legislature has less drastic means available to
achieve the purposes of the notice requirement, such as adoption of a
169. See Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207 (1966);
Frasch v. City of New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 43, 153 N.W. 121, 122 (1915).
170. See 85 Wash. 2d at 817, 539 P.2d at 850.
171. Id.
172. See Downing & Tehin, The Constitutional Infirmity of the CaliforniaGovernment
Claim Statute, 1 PEPPERDINE L. Rv.209, 225 (citing 9 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Rep.
55 (1969)).
173. 85 Wash, 2d at 817, 539 P.2d at 849-50.
174. See Note, Delay in Notice of Claim Against a Government Agency, 20 CLEV. ST.
L. Rzv. 23, 30 (1970); 23 DRAKE L. Rav. 696, 705 (1974).
175. See Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 860-61, 146 N.W.2d 626, 636-37 (1966);
Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factorin the Decision of CertainTypes of Tort Cases,
78 U. PA. L. REv. 805, 815-41 (1930); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REv.
41, 48-49 (1949).
176. Cf. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character,
and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial,
promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.").
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notice statute granting discretion to the trial court to disregard late
notice where appropriate.177 Recent Minnesota cases indicate a willingness to strike down the notice statute'78 and therefore a decision to
invoke this intermediate test to invalidate the statute would not be
surprising.
iii. The Minimum Scrutiny, "Rational Basis" Test
The large majority of cases that have considered the validity of notice
statutes under the equal protection clause have applied the minimum
scrutiny, rational basis test.' These cases almost invariably hold that
the justifications for the notice requirement are sufficient to satisfy the
minimum scrutiny test,'8 0 although the cases generally are not particularly well reasoned. 8' Considering the minimal justification required to
satisfy the rational basis test,8 2 however, these cases are not necessarily
erroneous. Although the justifications for the notice statute are not
strong,'' cumulatively they may be sufficient to satisfy this test. Conversely, though, a court with a dislike for the notice statute, such as the
Minnesota court, 84 could readily strike down the statute under the minimum scrutiny test. For example, the Hunter court, in a footnote, indicated that even if it had applied the minimum scrutiny test, the justifications for the notice requirement would be inadequate. 5 Similarly, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the recent case of O'Neil v.
City of Parkersburg,8 ' applying the minimum scrutiny test, found the
177. See notes 197-204 infra and accompanying text.
178. See cases cited in note 109 supra.
179. See, e.g., Dias v. Eden Valley Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 504, 370 P.2d 334, 335,
20 Cal. Rptr. 630, 631 (1962); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 714, 535 P.2d 1348, 1351
(1975); Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 111. 2d 288, 293, 348 N.E.2d 176, 180 (1976); Lunday
v. Vogelman, 213 N.W.2d 904,907 (Iowa 1973); Guarrara v. A.L. Lee Memorial Hosp., 51
App. Div. 2d 867, 867, 380 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (1975).
180. See note 179 supra. Minnesota also has ample precedent finding notice statutes
constitutional. See, e.g., Olson v. City of Virginia, 211 Minn. 64, 300 N.W. 42 (1941);
Frasch v. City of New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41,153 N.W. 121 (1915); Schigley v. City of Waseca,
106 Minn. 94, 118 N.W. 259 (1908).
181. For example, the Minnesota case most often relied upon for the proposition that
notice statutes are constitutional, Olson v. City of Virginia, 211 Minn. 64, 300 N.W. 42
(1941), makes only the following cursory statement: "There can be no doubt that the
legislature acted within its constitutional powers in enacting the statute here involved."
Id. at 66, 300 N.W. at 43. Similarly, another leading case noted only that governmental
units need notice to correct dangerous defects and to facilitate settlement and therefore
the notice requirement does not improperly discriminate against similarly situated private
defendants. See Frasch v. City of New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 43-44, 153 N.W. 121, 122 (1915).
182. See notes 137-38 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 164-75 supra and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., cases cited in note 109 supra.
185. See 85 Wash. 2d at 815 n.8, 539 P.2d at 850 n.8.
186. W. Va. -_,237 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
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justifications for the notice statute to be inadequate.' 7 However, the
notice period involved in O'Neil was an unusually short one' 8 and this
clearly affected the court's decision.'89
As opposed to analyzing the justifications for the notice statute, three
courts have held the statute unconstitutional under the rational basis
test by analyzing the purposes of their states' municipal tort liability
laws. The Michigan Supreme Court in Reich v. State Highway
Department, 9 the Nevada Supreme Court in Turner v. Staggs,'9' and
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in O'Neil v. City of
Parkersburg9 2 found that the purpose of those laws was to place governmental defendants on the same footing with private defendants, and,
conversely, to place the victims of negligent municipal and private conduct in an equal position.'93 These courts found that the classifications
created between municipal and private tortfeasors on the one hand, and
the victims of their negligence on the other, bear no rational relation to
the legislative objective of equality, and arbitrarily bar suit by those
injured through governmental negligence.' 94
Whether the reasoning of Reich, Turner, and O'Neil would be valid
in Minnesota is subject to some doubt. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has stated that the Municipal Tort Liability Act is not intended to place
municipal defendants on equal footing with private defendants. " The
187. Id. at -,237 S.E.2d at 508. The court in O'Neil reasoned that the justifications
for the notice statute were equally applicable to private defendants and therefore did not
justify the classification. Id.
237 S.E.2d at 506 (West Virginia notice statute requires notice within
188. Id. at __,
30 days of injury).
237 S.E.2d at 508 ("Requiring one so injured to give notice of such
189. Id. at -,
injury within a short period of thirty days, as a condition precedent to the right to sue, is
neither reasonable nor fair.").
190. 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
191. 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973).
192. W. Va. -. , 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
193. See Reich v. State Highway Dept., 386 Mich. at 623, 194 N.W.2d at 702; Turner
W. Va. at
v. Staggs, 89 Nev. at 235, 510 P.2d at 882; O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, __
237 S.E.2d at 508-09.
194. See Reich v. State Highway Dept., 386 Mich. at 623, 194 N.W.2d at 702; Turner
W. Va. at
v. Staggs, 89 Nev. at 235, 510 P.2d at 882; O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, __
237 S.E.2d at 508-09.
195. See McCarty v. Village of Nashwauk, 286 Minn. 240, 243-44, 175 N.W.2d 144, 147
(1970) ("The argument that in abrogating immunity the legislature intended that governmental units should be liable in the same manner as a private individual under like
circumstances ignores the reality that there are many governmental activities which have
... ). However, it may be argued that the effect, if not the
no private counterpart.
purpose, of the Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act is to place municipal and private
tortfeasors upon an equal basis. The Minnesota court has stated that in relation to torts
arising from proprietary functions, for which municipalities historically always have been
liable, municipal defendants should have no advantage over private defendants in defend239 N.W.2d 187, 189-90
Minn. -, ing claims. See McCaleb v. Jackson, -
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court has reasoned that the exceptions within the Act, whereby governmental immunity remains for some activities, evidence a clear intent
that municipalities not be liable in the same manner as private defendants.16 Therefore, unless the court changes its position, it appears that
the arguments accepted in Reich, Turner, and O'Neil are not available
in Minnesota.
In summary, if the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the minimum
scrutiny test it might have difficulty justifying holding the notice statute unconstitutional. However, if an intermediate, fair and substantial
relation test was invoked, Hunter provides strong and sound support for
holding the statute violative of equal protection. An intermediate test
appears to be the most appropriate one for the notice statute, since the
statute affects the important right of access to the courts for redress of
wrongs. Therefore, if the Minnesota court adopted this intermediate
test, it probably would find the notice requirement to be unconstitutional.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The doctrines of substantial compliance, waiver, and estoppel have
provided the Minnesota courts with the tools necessary to mitigate
much of the harshness of the notice requirement. In addition, the extension of time granted incapacitated persons has greatly reduced the inequities such persons face with the notice rule. The above theories,
however, represent a piecemeal approach which still leaves some claimants unjustly exposed to the possibility of being denied recovery because
of the notice requirement and renders the notice statute susceptible to
constitutional attack. For these reasons, a more comprehensive reform
of the notice statute is needed, a reform which both protects the legitimate interests of the municipalities and prevents claimants from having
their recovery barred when improper notice does not prejudice the municipality. The notice statutes of several other jurisdictions,' 7 most notably New York, 98 may serve as a useful guide for the needed reform.
The New York statute, while stating a definite period in which notice
must be given, creates an exception whereby late notice is permitted at
the sound discretion of the trial court.' The New York courts are re(1976). Under the Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act, the distinction between municipal liability for governmental as opposed to proprietary interests has been abolished,
and therefore the reasoning of McCaleb should apply to all torts giving rise to liability
under the Act.
196. McCarty v. Village of Nashwauk, 286 Minn. 240, 243-44, 175 N.W.2d 144, 147
(1970).
197. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 911.4, 946.6 (West 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-.9 (West
Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5301 (Purdon 1972).
198. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976).
199. Id. § 50-e(5) provides:
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quired to consider all relevant circumstances in the exercise of this
discretion, including actual notice by the municipality or its insurer of
potential claims, the physical and mental capacity of the claimant,
death of the claimant, justifiable reliance upon municipal settlement
representations, error in identifying the municipality, and, most significantly, prejudice to the municipality caused by the delay.2 °0 The statute
authorizes the trial court to correct, supply, or disregard defects in the
notice, unless such action would prejudice the defendant., It also requires municipalities to return improperly served notice within thirty
days of service .20 2 An additional provision, not included in the New York
statute, which should be considered in Minnesota is that any other
legitimate reason, not prejudicial to the municipality, will excuse late

notice .201
The adoption by the Minnesota Legislature of a notice statute similar
to that in New York and several other states would effectively eliminate
Upon application, the court, in its discretion, may extend the time to serve a
notice of claim specified in paragraph (a) of subdivision one.
The extension shall not exceed the time limited for the commencement of an
action by the claimant against the public corporation. In determining whether
to grant the extension, the court shall consider, in particular, whether the public
corporation or its attorney or its insurance carrier acquired actual knowledge of
the essential facts constituting the claim within the time specified in subdivision
one or within a reasonable time thereafter. The court shall also consider all other
relevant facts and circumstances, including: whether the claimant was an infant, or mentally or physically incapacitated, or died before the time limited for
service of the notice of claim; whether the claimant failed to serve a timely
notice of claim by reason of his justifiable reliance upon settlement representations made by an authorized representative of the public corporation or its
insurance carrier; whether the claimant in serving a notice of claim made an
excusable error concerning the identity of the public corporation against which
the claim should be asserted; and whether the delay in serving the notice of
claim substantially prejudiced the public corporation in maintaining its defense
on the merits.
An application for leave to serve a late notice shall not be denied on the
ground that it was made after commencement of an action against the public
corporation.
200. Id. One factor, which the New York statute does not include, but which arguably
should be central to the decision to permit the giving of late notice, is whether in the
particular case the purposes of the notice statute would be served by not allowing late
notice.
201. Id. § 50-e(6).
202. Notice must be returned by the municipality, specifying the defect in the manner
of service, unless the municipality demands that the claimant or any other person interested in the claim be examined in regard to the claim. Id. § 50-e(3)(c). The claimant must
properly serve notice within ten days after receipt of the returned notice. Id. § 50-e(3)(d).
203. The Pennsylvania notice statute is illustrative. The statute provides simply that
the claimant may request "leave of court to enter such action upon a showing of a reasonable excuse for such failure to file said notice.
"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5301 (Purdon
1972).
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the inequities created by the present Minnesota notice statute. In addition, the threat that the statute will be held unconstitutional would be
substantially lessened, thereby retaining legislative control over the liability of municipalities. Moreover, such a revision of the present statute
should significantly reduce the large amount of litigation that the notice
statute has caused over the years. In light of the Minnesota Legislature's
progressive liberalization of the notice statute in the recent past, 04 the
possibility that it would approve a statute similar to New York's is not
unrealistic.
204. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
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